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ABSTRACT
The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) was a 
legislative response to the acquittal of John Hinckley 
by reason of insanity. Part of the motivation for this 
legislation was to decrease the number of successful 
insanity defense pleas in the federal courts by 
changing who has the burden of proof from the 
prosecution to the defense. This study used mock 
juries to examine whether there would be fewer 
acquittals by reason of insanity under the IDRA than 
there had been under the previous law. This study also 
investigated whether the jurors understood the pattern 
jury instructions containing the applicable law.
Finally this study examined how the deliberation 
process may have influenced individual decisions by 
examining jurors responses before and after 
deliberation. One hundred thirty four students at the 
College of William and Mary were shown a videotape of a 
mock trial based on an actual trial involving the 
insanity defense. Before and after deliberation 
subjects made determinations regarding the defendant's 
guilt, their attitude towards the defendant's insanity 
plea and completed a comprehension questionnaire.
Instructions consistent with the IDRA did not lead to 
significantly more guilty jury verdicts, X2(3, N =134)
= 4.37, n.s., but after deliberation there were 
significantly more not guilty by reason of insanity 
verdicts when the burden was on the prosecution to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, X2(3, N =
134) = 12.44, p<.05. Analysis of the subjects' 
attitude towards the defendant's insanity plea 
indicated that significantly more subjects believed the 
defendant was less morally responsible for his behavior 
when the burden was on the prosecution to prove sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt, F(1,127) = 4.30, p<.05. 
Furthermore, when the burden was on the prosecution to 
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects 
more strongly endorsed the idea that the defendant 
should be in a psychiatric hospital rather than a 
prison in comparison to those subjects in the condition 
requiring the defense to prove insanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt, F(1,127) = 5.34, p<.05. Jury 
deliberation did not significantly impact the subjects' 
attitude towards the defendant's insanity plea or 
comprehension of the jury instructions. The jurors had 
particular difficulty comprehending the instructions
regarding who had the burden of proof when the burden 
was on the prosecution to prove sanity. This study did 
not find that jury decisions were significantly 
effected by the jury instructions, but the individual 
juror's decisions regarding the verdicts after 
deliberation did significantly differ depending upon 
the instruction condition. Also some of the individual 
juror's attitudes towards the insanity plea were 
significantly influenced by the instructions provided. 
Juror comprehension of the pattern jury instructions 
was impaired, particularly when the burden was on the 
prosecution to prove sanity.
Kathleen Dring 
Department of Psychology 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
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Changes Implemented Pursuant to the 
Insanity Defense Reform Act:
Effect on Trial by Jury Outcome 
One of the underlying theories of the insanity 
defense is based on the requirement that a crime 
requires the joint operation of act and intent 
(Handspike v. State. 1947). One who is insane cannot 
have the requisite mens rea (mental state) necessary to 
be held responsible for the criminal act (Callahan, 
Mayer & Steadman, 1987). Another theory underlying the 
insanity defense centers around the notion of free 
will. Criminal responsibility is assessed when a man 
has free will and elects to do evil (U.S. v. Brawner. 
1972). A person who is insane at the time of the 
criminal act is not punishable because he or she lacks 
free will (Carter v. U.S.. 1957).
There have been five major attempts in the,U.S. to 
determine the nature of criminal responsibility and the 
types of conduct requisite for the insanity defense 
(Simon & Aaronson, 1988). The early foundations of the 
insanity defense arose from the case of Daniel 
M'Naghten (M'Naghten's Case. 1843).
M'Naghten suffered from what today may be
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described as delusions of persecution symptomatic of 
paranoid schizophrenia (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1983). He shot an assistant to the prime 
minister of England mistakenly believing the assistant 
to be the prime minister. At trial, the jury returned 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
This verdict evoked angry reactions from the 
public, parliament and Queen Victoria. The reactions 
resulted in the House of Lords requesting 15 common law 
judges to account for this perceived miscarriage of 
justice (Simon & Aaronson, 1988). The response of 
these judges has become known as the M'Naghten rule. 
Under the M'Naghten rule the accused cannot be 
convicted if at the time of the crime, the accused was 
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing, or that if he did know it, he did not 
know what he was doing was yrong (Simon & Aaronson, 
1988).
The M'Naghten rule was widely accepted in the 
United States by 1851 and still remains the basis of 
the insanity defense in many states (Callahan et al., 
1987). Some courts have supplemented the M'Naghten 
test with the concept of irresistible impulse. This
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recognizes insanity as a defense when a mental disease 
results in an impulse '*such as to override the reason 
and judgement and obliterate the sense of right or 
wrong to the extent that the accused is deprived of the 
choice between right and wrong” (Smith v. U.S.. 1929, 
p. 549). Under the irresistible impulse standard, a 
defendant can be acquitted of a crime if his or her 
mental disease deprives the defendant of the will power 
to resist an insane impulse, even though the defendant 
knows the act is wrong.
In Durham v . U.S. (1954), the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected the M'Naghten rule 
and substituted a broader test for insanity known as 
the Durham rule. This test provided that "an accused 
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was 
the product of a mental disease or defect" (Durham v. 
U.S.. 1954, p. 859). This rule was devised to 
facilitate expert testimony which was perceived to be 
confined by the narrowly focused M'Naghten rule. The 
M'Naghten rule by focusing on the defendant's cognitive 
impairment (i.e. ability to know right from wrong), 
restricted information medical experts could convey to 
the judge and the jury about the defendant's total 
mental functioning (U.S. v. Brawner, 1972). The
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adoption of the Durham rule resulted in significant 
increases in acquittals by reason of insanity in the 
District of Columbia (Weiner 1980). This rule did not 
gain wide acceptance among other jurisdictions (Simon & 
Aaronson, 1988).
In U.S. v. Brawner. 1972, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected the Durham rule and 
adopted with minor modification, Section 4.01(1) of the 
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (ALI). 
This rule states as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct 
if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.
One of the reasons the court rejected the Durham 
rule was that it resulted in undue dominance of the 
medical expert. This over-reliance on medical 
testimony was caused by the Durham rule requirement 
that the crime be a "product" of the mental disease.
The medical expert testimony was given in terms of a 
non-medical construct ("product"), to express a 
conclusion that included moral and legal concerns. In
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Brawner v. U.S.. (1972) , the court commented on this
reason for rejecting the Durham rule as follows:
There is, indeed irony in a situation under which 
the Durham rule, which was adopted in large part 
to permit experts to testify in their own terms 
concerning matters within their domain which the 
jury should know, resulted in testimony by the 
experts in terms not their own, to reflect 
unexpressed judgments in a domain that is properly 
not theirs but the jury's, (p. 98 3)
The ALI rule was applicable in. all federal 
jurisdictions and a majority of the states on March 30, 
1981 when John Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate 
President Ronald Reagan as he left a hotel in 
Washington D.C. On June 21, 1982 a federal jury 
acquitted Hinckley of 13 crimes by a verdict of "not 
guilty by reason of insanity." This verdict was a 
catalyst for a wide range of reactions advocating 
changes in the insanity defense laws. The implicit 
goal of many of these proposals was to decrease the 
amount of acquittals by reason of insanity (Rogers, 
1987). The reactions evoked from this verdict has many 
parallels to that which occurred subsequent to the 
acquittal of Daniel M'Naghten (Rogers, 1987).
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Bonnie (1983), who was an influential witness at 
the Congressional hearings on the insanity defense 
subsequent to Hinckley's acquittal, had two primary 
recommendations. First, he recommended that the 
volitional prong (i.e. "to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law") be eliminated from the 
insanity defense. Bonnie reasoned that "there is no 
scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for 
self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that 
capacity." (p. 196). Secondly, he proposed that the 
burden of persuasion should be shifted from the 
prosecution to the defense.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. U.S.. (1895)
established the rule applicable in federal courts 
regarding which party has the burden of proof on the 
insanity issue. According to this rule, there is a 
presumption of sanity at the time of the offense. The 
defendant must introduce some evidence of insanity at 
the time of the crime. Once this burden of going 
forward with the evidence has been met, the presumption 
of sanity has been rebutted, and the government then 
carries the burden of persuasion to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the 
time of the crime (U.S. v. Brawner. 1972).
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This was the law applicable to Hinckley's case and 
also was the source of much of the angry reaction 
subsequent to his acquittal. Shortly after the 
verdict, members of the Hinckley jury were invited to 
testify before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Some of the jurors testified that the 
judge's instructions on the burden of proof affected 
their verdict (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
The American Bar Association recommended that the 
volitional prong of the insanity defense be eliminated 
(Rogers, 1987). Their recommendation regarding burden 
of proof hinged upon whether the ALI or M'Naghten test 
for insanity is utilized. In those jurisdictions using 
the ALI test, the American Bar Association advocated 
that the defendant should have the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he/she was insane 
at the time of the offense. In those jurisdictions 
using a M'Naghten rule, the American Bar Association 
recommended that the prosecution should have the burden 
of disproving the defendant's claim of insanity beyond 
a reasonable doubt (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
The American Psychiatric Association (1983) 
proposed that the ALI standard be revised by 
eliminating the volitional prong of the insanity
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defense and retain only the cognitive component (i.e. 
"lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct"). The American 
Psychiatric Association (1983) reasoned that 
psychiatric testimony relevant to whether a defendant 
understands the nature of his\her act has a more 
scientific basis than testimony relevant to whether a 
defendant was able to control his behavior.
Though declining to make a recommendation 
regarding who should have the burden of proof, the 
American Psychiatric Association (1983) did define the 
issue as whether the rights of the state or the rights 
of the individual are to be given more or less weight 
in insanity trials In citing Addington v. Texas, a 
U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court stated in 
dicta that psychiatric evidence is usually not 
sufficiently clear cut to prove many legal facts beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the American Psychiatric 
Association (1983) clearly framed this issue as one of 
great import in insanity trials. The American 
Psychiatric Association (1983) stated as follows:
It is commonly believed that the likely effect of 
assigning the burden of proof (burden of 
persuasion) to the defendant rather than the state
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in insanity trials will be to decrease the number 
of such successful defenses. This matter clearly 
requires further empirical study. (p. 685)
The American Psychological Association was 
critical of the reactions of the American Psychiatric 
Association and the American Bar Association mainly on 
the basis that there was insufficient empirical 
evidence to make specific recommendations about the 
insanity defense. The American Psychological 
Association urged restraint despite the public and 
political pressure for immediate restructuring of the 
insanity defense (Rogers, 1987).
In 1984 the United States Congress in a 
significant legislative response to the Hinckley 
verdict, enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 
U.S.C. Section 17 (IDRA). This marked the first 
federal codification of the insanity defense (Simon & 
Aaronson, 1988). The IDRA states as follows:
(a) Affirmative defense- It is an affirmative 
defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute 
that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant as a 
result of a severe mental disease, was unable to
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appreciate the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of his act. Mental disease or defect 
does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of proof- The defendant has the burden 
of proving the defense of insanity by clear and 
convincing evidence.
The IDRA differs from the ALI standard in several 
ways. First, it eliminates the volitional prong as was 
recommended by the American Psychiatric Association and 
the American Bar Association. Second, the Act places 
the burden on the defendant to prove insanity by clear 
and convincing evidence. Most states that place the 
burden of proof on the defendant only require the 
defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the 
evidence (Simon & Aaronson, 1988). This lesser burden 
would have been consistent with the American Bar 
Association's proposal. Finally, the IDRA adopted a 
more stringent cognitive standard (i.e. "unable to 
appreciate" as opposed to "lacks substantial capacity 
to appreciate"), for demonstrating insanity.
The constitutionality of placing the burden of 
proof upon the defendant has been unsuccessfully 
challenged (U.S. v. Amos. 1986; U.S. v. Freeman.
1986). In U.S. v. Amos. (1986), the Court of Appeals
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for the 8th Circuit held that the IDRA was not 
violative of due process by shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant or by setting the standard for 
the burden of proof at clear and convincing evidence 
rather than preponderance of the evidence. In Amos
(1986), the court relied on Leland v. Oregon. (1952), 
in which the Supreme Court held an Oregon statute 
constitutional that required the defendant to prove 
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In Leland (1952), 
the Court ruled that the issue of insanity is separate 
from the crime charged and as long as the prosecution 
must prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the statute was not constitutionally 
infirm.
The changes instituted by the IDRA were primarily 
motivated to reduce the number of successful assertions 
of the insanity defense (American Psychological 
Association, 1987; Callahan et al., 1987; Dripps,
1987). There has been little or no empirical 
investigation as to how the IDRA has impacted trial by 
jury outcomes and how this law has affected attitudes 
toward a particular defendant's insanity plea.
Homant and Kennedy (1987) investigated the 
variations in expert witnesses' judgments of insanity
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in a hypothetical case. They found that a favorable 
opinion of the defendant's insanity plea correlated 
with being a psychiatrist, having a liberal ideology 
and having received a neutral as opposed to a 
sympathetic or unsympathetic version of the case. It 
was also found in a post hoc analysis that an 
association existed between experts residing in states 
where the prosecution has the burden of proof to show 
sanity and a favorable opinion of the defendant's 
insanity plea. Homant and Kennedy (1987) concluded 
that their study lent support to the contention that 
placing the burden of proof on the defense would reduce 
the number of inappropriate insanity verdicts.
As exemplified by the testimony of the several 
Hinckley jurors before a subcommittee of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the jury instructions are a 
crucial factor in any trial. Improper jury 
instructions Can be the basis for reversal of a trial 
court decision (e.g. Wilson v. U.S.. 1914; Billeci v. 
U.S.. 1950). Psychological research has indicated that 
juror difficulties in comprehending instructions on the 
law is considerable and widespread (Severance, Greene & 
Loftus, 1984). A concern of psychological research has 
been to recognize jurors' difficulties in understanding
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the instructions and to use concepts of 
psycholinguistics to construct instructions that are 
both comprehensible and accurate reflections of the law 
(e.g., Borgida & Park, 1988; Elwork, Sales & Alfini, 
1977; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Severance, Greene & 
Loftus, 1984).
A common courtroom practice is the use of pattern 
jury instructions. Pattern jury instructions have been 
devised to address the concern that inaccurate jury 
instructions may give to rise to reversal on appeal. 
Pattern instructions are standardized statements of the 
law designed to be applicable generally to many cases 
(Severance & Loftus, 1982). These instructions are 
generally designed by committees of judges and lawyers 
to be routinely used in their jurisdictions (Severance, 
Greene & Loftus, 1984).
Strawn and Buchanan (1976), found that subject 
jurors who received oral pattern instructions only 
showed slight improvement in comprehension of legal 
issues as compared to subject jurors who received no 
instructions. Elwork, Sales and Alfini (1977), 
examined pattern instructions pertaining to the law of 
negligence and found no significant difference in 
comprehension of negligence law between a group
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receiving pattern instructions and a group receiving no 
instructions. Similarly, comprehension of jury 
instructions regarding the entrapment defense was found 
to be poor because of the complexity of the language 
used in the instruction (Borgida & Park, 1988).
Severance and Loftus (1982) found that one of the 
common areas of juror misconception concerns the notion 
of "reasonable doubt" as applied in the criminal law. 
Juror subjects receiving pattern jury instructions did 
not have significantly greater comprehension of 
"reasonable doubt" than did those jurors receiving no 
instructions.
A different result was found by Kerr, Atkin, 
Stasser, Meek, Holt and Davis (1976), who examined the 
concept of reasonable doubt as both an individual and a 
group decision criteria. The "reasonable doubt" 
variable had three levels. The first group of subjects 
received no instructions and the other 2 groups of 
subjects received reasonable doubt instructions of 
varying stringency. In the individual decision 
condition those individuals who were given the more lax 
definition of reasonable doubt rendered the highest 
portion of guilty verdicts. Those in the no 
instruction condition gave proportionally more guilty
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verdicts than the stringent criteria group but less 
than the lax criteria group. One of the conclusions 
reached in this study was that the concept of 
reasonable doubt is not obvious to their sample of 
college students (Kerr et al. 1976). This is 
consistent with Dane (1985) who concluded that the 
concept of reasonable doubt is a difficult concept for 
jurors to comprehend and to apply effectively in 
rendering a decision.
Kagehiro (1990) reviewed research on juror 
comprehension that compared definitions of three levels 
of the standard of proof (preponderance of the 
evidence, clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable 
doubt). She concluded that quantified definitions in 
which the standard of proof is expressed in probability 
terms and combined quantified and legal definitions had 
their intended effect. The number of favorable 
plaintiff verdicts increased as the standard of proof 
became stricter. Definitions that did not use 
quantified definitions did not have the intended 
effect.
Other studies have examined the impact of jury 
instructions on juror's decisions. Cruse and Browne
(1987) found that the timing of instructions did not
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significantly effect the juror's reasoning or verdicts 
but the frequency of the instructions influenced the 
jurors use of legal rules in making their verdicts. 
Greene (1988) evaluated the effectiveness of a 
simplified instruction compared to a more 
linguistically complicated instruction that is commonly 
used in the courtroom to focus juror's attention on 
eyewitness issues. It was found that those jurors 
hearing the revised instruction were more knowledgeable 
of the existing factors to consider when evaluating 
eyewitness testimony and were less likely to convict 
the defendant.
Helgeson and Shaver (1990) demonstrated the 
importance of examining the impact of jury instructions 
in realistic settings. In a series of three studies 
involving a criminal indictment, an instruction 
regarding the presumption of innocence, used to 
alleviate a nonevidentiary bias (congruence between 
crime and offender's occupation), was not effective in 
eliminating the congruent effects when the trial 
information was presented in a brief written format.
The congruence effect was alleviated when the 
instructions were given in the context of a full trial. 
Helgeson and Shaver (1990) concluded that experiments
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concerned with legal and social judgement processes 
that do not incorporate realism into their design may 
discover spurious biases that may not be found in 
richer experimental environments.
Issues of external validity have been a major 
concern in a variety of legal research areas. One 
particular area of concern is whether individual 
judgments can be used to make conclusions about 
group/jury judgments. A discussion of the general 
conceptual problems associated with extrapolating 
research results from individual cognitive behavior to 
social behavior has been discussed by Davis (1982). 
Davis, Kameda, Parks, Stasson & Zimmerman (1989) note 
that individual-to-group extrapolations can be flawed 
when there is a failure to consider the contribution of 
interpersonal interaction on group member opinion 
change. McGowen and King (1982) found that juries 
render more moderate decisions than do individuals and 
concluded that it is therefore important to consider 
verdicts from juries rather than from isolated jurors. 
These results were consistent with Izett and Leginiski 
(1974) who found that for mock juries, post-discussion 
verdicts were significantly more lenient than pre­
discussion verdicts for an unattractive defendant.
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The finding that juries render more moderate 
decisions than individuals should be considered with 
other research on group decisions that has found that 
groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme 
than, but in the same direction as the initial 
individual decisions (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987; 
Kaplan, 1977). Investigations of this group 
polarization effect in mock jury situations has shown 
that when decisions are made on a bipolar judgement 
dimension, group discussion tends to move the average 
of both the individual and group preferences toward the 
pole that the prediscussion individual preference 
favors (Kaplan & Miller, 1977; Kaplan & Miller,1978). 
Polarization does not occur when equal sized and 
equally opinionated factions are opposed (MacCoun,
1989).
One aspect of jury research that is not explained 
by group polarization is the leniency effect that was 
initially described by Kalven and Zeisel (1966). The 
leniency effect refers to the finding that not-guilty 
majorities have greater power than guilty majorities in 
establishing group-level consensus (Davis et al.,
1989). Deliberation in mock jury studies generally 
leads to greater leniency (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek,&
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Holt, 1977; Kerr, 1981). This leniency effect was even 
observed when the jurors seemed to initially favor 
conviction (Tanford & Penrod, 1986).
Spitzer, & Holt (1976) suggest that the leniency 
effect is reflective of a "defendant protection norm". 
MacCoun and Kerr (1988) found this effect when jurors 
were given reasonable doubt instructions and not when 
they heard the same case with preponderance of the 
evidence instructions. The reasonable doubt standard 
may provide a rhetorical advantage for jurors favoring 
acquittal during deliberation, and the effect of the 
standard is magnified by group discussion (MacCoun, 
1989).
Mock jury research has also considered how group 
members resolve initial differences and reach 
consensus. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) proposed two 
processes of social influence in groups: normative and
informational. Normative influence is defined as 
"influence to conform with the positive expectations of 
another," and informational influence is defined as 
"influence to accept information from another as 
evidence of reality" (p.629). Kaplan and Miller (1983) 
assert that informational influence may be the dominant 
process when no consensus is needed, judgments are
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private, or fact finding is emphasized. Normative 
influence may be more likely when agreement is 
required, judgments are publicly made, or social 
concerns are emphasized.
Both of these processes are activated in jury 
decision making (Stasser & Davis, 1981; Tanford & 
Penrod, 1986). Tanford and Penrod (1986) suggest that 
to the extent that normative influence occurs in a 
jury, verdicts should be a function of jurors' vote 
preferences. Informational influence should operate 
through the content of deliberations. Stasser and 
Davis (1981) found that juror's stated verdict 
preferences were predominantly influenced by normative 
pressures, but certainty of their decision was 
susceptible to informational influence. In actual jury 
decisions both processes occur. There is often a 
requirement of unanimity, so there is pressure for a 
group consensus resulting in a normative influence. 
Trials also call upon juries to be fact finders, so 
there is an informational influence (Tanford & Penrod, 
1986).
Mathematical models have been proposed to predict 
group choice shifts from the initial individual 
preferences to group consensus. A model frequently
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used in mock jury research is the social decision 
scheme proposed by Davis (197 3) . This model maps the 
likelihood of transitions from initial, predeliberation 
conviction-to acquittal ratios in the group to final 
group verdicts. Research applying this theory has 
consistently shown that the verdict preferred by a 
clear majority of jurors at the outset of deliberation 
is likely to be chosen as the group's final verdict 
(MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).
The purpose of this study was to examine how the 
changes implemented by the IDRA regarding who has the 
burden of proof (i.e. prosecution or defense), and the 
required level of the proof (beyond a reasonable doubt 
or clear and convincing) will affect acquittal rates 
and attitudes towards the defendant's insanity defense 
in a hypothetical case. Furthermore, given the 
research indicating juror difficulty in understanding 
jury instructions, this study investigated whether the 
jurors would be able to recall and apply important 
legal points relative to the insanity defense, after 
they had been read the jury instructions. Finally, 
this research compared individual decisions regarding 
the defendant's insanity plea before and after jury 
deliberation. Particular attention was given to the
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leniency effect and the majority decision scheme.
The first hypothesis of this study was that the 
jury instruction consistent with the IDRA (i.e. burden 
on the defendant, clear and convincing evidence), would 
result in significantly fewer acquittals and would 
result in the jurors having a less favorable attitude 
towards the insanity defense than the jury instructions 
consistent with the ALI rule (i.e. burden on the 
prosecution, beyond a reasonable doubt). Furthermore, 
the more stringent standard of proof when the burden is 
on the prosecution, would result in more juries and 
jurors finding the defendant not guilty and having a 
more favorable attitude towards the insanity plea as 
presented. The more stringent standard of proof when 
the burden is on the defense, would result in more 
juries and jurors finding the defendant guilty and 
having a less favorable attitude towards the 
defendant's insanity plea. It was also, hypothesized 
that the subjects would understand the jury 
instructions and they would be able to properly apply 
the law contained therein to the facts of the case as 
presented.
Finally, this study hypothesized that the jury 
deliberations would influence the individual decision
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results as reflected by a difference between the pre 
and post deliberation measures. Furthermore, it was 
hypothesized that the group final verdicts would 




One hundred thirty four undergraduate students 
over the age of 18 years from the College of William 
and Mary participated in this study. Each subject 
received two hours of research credit for their 
participation. The subjects were solicited from sign­
up sheets posted in the psychology building at the 
College. The sign-up sheets indicated that the purpose 
of the study was to investigate the insanity defense 
laws.
Materials
A hypothetical case derived from the transcript of 
U.S. v . Amos (1986) was presented in videotape format.
A summary of the case presented to the mock jurors is 
found in Appendix A. U.S. v. Amos (1986) was a case 
heard shortly after passage of the IDRA and was 
unsuccessfully appealed by the defendant on the basis 
that placing the burden of proving insanity by clear
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and convincing evidence upon the defendant was 
unconstitutional. It was one of the first reported 
cases applying the IDRA. It involved extensive 
psychiatric testimony on the insanity issue. The 
government's expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz, had 
testified in the Hinckley trial.
The research videotape was made in the Moot Court 
Room at the Marsha11-Wythe School of Law. The same one 
hour videotape of the trial was shown to all of the 
subjects. The only variation in the videotape was in 
the judge's instructions to the jury which corresponded 
to the four treatment conditions in the study. The 
jury instructions were derived from the pattern jury 
instructions commonly used in federal court (Appendix 
B, Jury Instruction: Burden on Defense, Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt; Appendix C, Jury Instruction: Burden 
on Defense, Clear and Convincing Evidence; Appendix D, 
Jury Instruction: Burden on Prosecution, Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt; Appendix E, Jury Instruction: Burden 
on Prosecution, Clear and Convincing Evidence). The 
attorneys on the videotape were actual attorneys 
licensed to practice in Virginia and admitted to the 
Federal Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The experts were played by psychology students in their
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first year of the Masters program at William and Mary. 
The judge was also a psychology graduate student. No 
evidentiary matters were ruled upon by the judge and 
her main function was to read the jury instructions and 
to introduce aspects of the trial at transitional 
points.
Each subject was presented with a questionnaire 
(IDQ), after watching the videotape, designed to 
measure their attitude towards the insanity defense 
plea presented in the hypothetical case (Appendix F). 
This questionnaire is a modification of that used by 
Homant and Kennedy (1987). The questionnaire consists 
of six items and the subjects were asked to respond 
with a number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) for each item. The lower the score on this 
scale the greater the support for the defendant's 
insanity plea. Total scores possible on the measure 
range from 6 to 30.
Also, each subject received a verdict form 
(Appendix G), which asked the subject whether they 
would find the defendant guilty or not guilty by reason 
of insanity. Actual juries in federal criminal trials 
are presented with three options: guilty, not guilty
and not guilty only by reason of insanity. These
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versions were modified to prevent confusion.
Finally, a comprehension questionnaire was given 
to each subject (Appendix H, Burden on Prosecution, 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; Appendix I, Burden on 
Prosecution, Clear and Convincing Evidence; Appendix J, 
Burden on Defense, Clear and Convincing Evidence; 
Appendix K Burden on Defense, Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt), to determine whether the subjects understood 
the law as contained in the jury instructions. This 
was presented to the jurors after they had heard the 
judge's instructions. Total scores possible on the 
measure range from 0 to 7.
Also a group verdict form was given to each jury 
on which they could indicate their group decision 
(Appendix L).
Procedure
The testing sessions were conducted in classrooms 
on the William and Mary campus. The subjects were 
tested in eight group sessions. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to one of the eight sessions. Upon 
arriving at the test session each subject was given a 
consent form.
The subjects were then read instructions about the 
study. After the instructions were read the researcher
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answered questions that the subjects may have had. The 
instructions informed the subjects that they would be 
watching a videotape of a reenactment of an actual 
trial involving the insanity defense and that they 
would be asked to render a verdict individually and in 
a jury setting. Those subjects willing to participate 
were then asked to sign the consent form. After 
signing the consent form the participants were shown 
the videotape. After the videotape the subjects were 
given a five minute break and they were instructed not 
to discuss the case with anyone during the break.
Then the subjects, in groups of 4-6, were shown 
the judge reading one set of the jury instructions. 
There were four different jury instructions (burden on 
prosecution, beyond a reasonable doubt; burden on 
prosecution, clear and convincing; burden on defense, 
beyond a reasonable doubt; burden on defense, clear and 
convincing). These instructions are presented in 
Appendices H through K. The reading of the instructions 
took approximately seven minutes. After hearing the 
instructions the subjects completed the individual 
verdict forms, the comprehension questionnaire and the 
IDQ. Subjects were then assigned to juries randomly.
Each test session consisted of 15 to 18 people.
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Attempts were made to have 6 person juries but this was 
not always possible due to some subjects not arriving 
for their test session. The jurors were instructed 
that they were to try and come to a unanimous decision 
regarding the defendant's insanity plea. If they could 
not come to a unanimous decision within 2 0 minutes they 
were informed that their jury would be considered a 
hung jury.
The deliberations took place in the Social 
Psychology laboratory. Each jury had their own private 
room. One person on each jury panel was asked to 
record the group's decision on the verdict form.
After returning to the classroom from deliberation 
the subjects were then given the same comprehension and 
attitude questionnaire they completed initially. They 
also completed another verdict questionnaire asking 
them whether they changed their vote in the 
deliberation process (Appendix M). The subjects were 
then thanked for their participation.
Results
Comparisons between the four jury instruction 
conditions showed that instructions regarding who has 
the burden of proof and the level of that burden did 
not significantly effect group jury verdicts. A chi-
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square analysis in which hung juries were grouped with 
not guilty verdicts, indicated that the four jury 
instructions did not significantly effect jury 
verdicts, X2(3, N = 24) = 4.44, n.s. Table 1 presents 
the distribution of jury verdicts for each instruction 
condition.
Insert Table 1 about here
Prior to jury deliberation, the individual 
verdicts did not differ depending on the instruction 
condition, X2(3, N =134) =4.37, n.s. After 
deliberation there was a significant difference between 
the individual verdicts by instruction, X2(3, N, = 134) 
= 12.44, p<.05. There were significantly more not 
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts when the burden 
was on the prosecution to prove insanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Table 2 presents the frequency 
distribution for individual verdicts before and after 
deliberation by instruction.
Insert Table 2 about here
A 2 (level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof)
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repeated measure analysis of variance was performed, 
with the repeated measure on each item of the IDQ 
before and after deliberation, to assess whether there 
were differences between the groups on the IDQ. Table 
3 presents the F ratios for each question on the IDQ.
Insert Table 3 about here
On IDQ(1) there was a significant between subjects 
burden x level interaction, F(l, 127) = 4.30, p<.05. 
When the burden was on the prosecution to prove sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects indicated that 
the defendant was less morally responsible for his 
behavior than when the burden was on the defense to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Figure 1 
presents this interaction.
Insert Figure 1 about here
On IDQ(2) there was a significant time (before or 
after deliberation) x level interaction, F(l,127) = 
5.22, p<.05. When the burden was clear and convincing 
the subjects showed greater endorsement of the 
statement "the defendant should be sentenced to prison
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for a long time" after deliberation, but when the 
burden was beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects 
showed less endorsement of this statement after 
deliberation., Figure 2 presents this interaction.
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Insert Figure 2 about here
On IDQ(3) there was a significant difference 
between the groups depending on whether the level of 
proof was clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable 
doubt, F(1,127) = 5.47, p<.05. When the level of proof 
was clear and convincing the subjects indicated that 
the defendant's behavior showed less probability of 
insanity (M = 4.02), than when the burden of proof was 
beyond a reasonable doubt (M = 3.65).
On IDQ(4) and IDQ(5) there were no significant 
differences between the groups either before or after 
deliberation. Refer to Table 3 for the relevant F 
ratios.
On IDQ(6) there was a significant level x burden 
between subjects interaction, F(l,127) =5.34, p<.05. 
Figure 2 presents the mean score on IDQ(6) as a 
function of level of proof and burden of proof.
Insert Figure 3 about here
When the burden is on the prosecution to prove sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects more strongly
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endorse the idea that the defendant should be in a 
hospital rather than a prison in comparison to those 
subjects in the condition requiring the defense to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Table 4 
presents the mean scores on each item of the IDQ before 
and after deliberation by instruction.
Insert Table 4 about here
A 2 (level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof) 
repeated measure of analysis of variance, with the 
individual jurors total correct answers on the 
comprehension questionnaire as the repeated measure, 
showed no significant differences before deliberation, 
F (20, 110) = 1.07, n.s., or after deliberation, F(20, 
110) = .94, n.s. Table 5 presents the mean number of 
correct answers on the comprehension questionnaire 
before and after deliberation.
Insert Table 5 about here
Each item on the comprehension questionnaire 
completed prior to deliberation was analyzed to 
determine if there was a difference between the
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instruction conditions in terms of whether the subjects 
answered an item correctly or incorrectly. On items 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 there were no significant differences 
between the instruction conditions on the number of 
correctly answered items. The results for each item 
were as follows: Item 1-X2(3, N = 134) = 1.33, n.s.;
Item 2—X2(3, N = 134) = 2.54, n.s.; Item 3-X2(3, N = 
.78, n.s.; Item 4-X2(3, N = 6.23, n.s.; Item 5-X2(3, N 
= 134) = 2.57, n.s.; Item 7-X2(3, N = 134) = 5.35, n.s.
On item 6, which elicited information about who 
has the burden to prove sanity/insanity, there was a 
significant difference between the instruction groups 
on the number of correct answers X2(3, N =134) =12.44, 
P<.05. When the burden was on the prosecution to prove 
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt significantly fewer 
subjects indicated this burden correctly. The 
distribution of the correct and incorrect answers on 
item 6 by instruction is provided in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
Note in Table 6 that when the burden was on the 
prosecution only 16 out of 67 (85%) subjects correctly 
stated that the burden was on the defense. When the
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burden was on the prosecution and the subjects 
correctly answered that the burden was on the 
prosecution 10/16 or 62% of them found the defendant 
guilty. When the burden was on the defense and the 
subjects correctly answered that the burden was on the 
defense 50/57 or 87% found the defendant guilty.
In order to assess whether the group deliberation 
process influenced individual decisions on the IDQ a 4 
(instruction) x 6 (jury nested within instruction) x 2 
(level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof) analysis of 
covariance, with the score on each item of the IDQ and 
the total score on the IDQ before deliberation being 
the covariate, was performed. Table 7 presents the 
results indicating that group deliberation did not 
significantly impact the subjects attitude towards the 
defendant's insanity plea.
Insert Table 7 about here
A similar analysis was performed to determine if 
the deliberation process significantly effected the 
total scores on the comprehension questionnaire. The 
were no significant effects for the level of proof,
F (1, 107) = .42, n.s.: for burden of proof, F(l, 107) =
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.70, n.s. or for the interaction between level and 
burden of proof, F(l, 107) = .10, n.s.
Discussion
The jury instructions regarding who has the burden 
of proof and the level of that proof did not effect 
jury verdicts. But this finding alone is insufficient 
to conclude that the IDRA will not lead to fewer 
successful insanity defense pleas than was found under 
the prior law. The reason for the reluctance to draw 
such a conclusion is based on the fact that the case as 
presented to these subjects heavily favored the 
prosecution and that the subjects had difficulty 
understanding the instructions regarding who had the 
burden of proof. These findings attenuate a conclusion 
that the jury verdicts were not influenced by the 
instructions and the applicable law as contained in 
these instructions.
In the analysis of the individual dependent 
measures there are some findings to suggest that the 
different instructions influenced these measures in the 
predicted direction. Prior to deliberation there were 
no differences among the jury instruction groups on 
individual verdict decisions, but after deliberation 
there were significantly more not guilty by reason of
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insanity verdicts when the burden was on the 
prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In an analysis of the individual responses to each 
item on the insanity defense questionnaire, some 
evidence suggests that who has the burden of proof and 
the level of that proof influences the jurors' 
attitudes towards the defendant's insanity plea.
Placing the burden on the prosecution to prove sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt resulted in significantly 
greater endorsement of the notion that the defendant is 
not morally responsible for his behavior, and that he 
should be in a hospital rather than a prison. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Homant and 
Kennedy (1987) who found that an association existed 
between who has the burden to prove sanity/insanity and 
attitudes towards the insanity defense. The results 
are also similar to that of Kerr et al. (1976) in that 
the most stringent standard for the prosecution results 
in the more favorable findings for the defendant.
The jurors did not increase their comprehension by 
participating in the deliberation process. This result 
can partially be explained by the large number of 
guilty verdicts, which in many cases rendered 
discussion unnecessary when all the subjects agreed on
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the verdict immediately. Possibly the high agreement 
in verdicts increased the subject's confidence that 
they comprehended the law as it was to be applied to 
the facts and decreased the need to,reassess their 
knowledge at the second administration of the 
comprehension questionnaire.
It has been concluded that groups tend to recall 
and recognize information better than individuals 
(Volarth, Sheppard, Hinsz & Davis, 1989). But this 
finding may be limited to situations where there is an 
actual decision making process allowing the group to 
check errors of the individual. Therefore, the nature 
of the task impacts the decision making process and 
thereby influences the ability of the group dynamic to 
increase accuracy in recall. In this study many jury's 
faced the task only of determining if there was a group 
consensus and upon finding such a consensus their task 
was complete. This is different from a situation where 
the problem to be solved requires an exchange of 
information between individuals regarding how and why 
they arrived at a decision. Possibly future research 
could be undertaken to require the jurors to complete 
comprehension questionnaires as part of their 
deliberation process.
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Though attempts were made to increase the external 
validity of the experiment by videotaping a mock trial 
based on an actual case, not all aspects of a real 
trial could be replicated. One important difference 
between the videotape and an actual trial concerns the 
attorneys' use of the burden issues when presenting a 
case before an actual jury. Adversarial techniques 
suggest that when an opposing party has a heavy burden 
of proof issue, it can be advantageously used in 
arguments to the jury, especially in closing 
statements. This is particularly effective for the 
defense when the prosecution has the burden to prove an 
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Due to experimental 
constraints this was not done on the videotape. Based 
on the findings of Cruse and Brown (1987), that it is 
not the timing of the instructions but the amount of 
times they are given, videotaping may have diluted the 
impact of the instructions.
Overall it does not seem that the jurors fully 
comprehended the jury instructions particularly with 
regard to who has the burden of proof and what is the 
level of proof. Of particular concern is that those 
subjects who were in the condition requiring the 
prosecution to prove sanity gave significantly more
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wrong answers on the question regarding this burden 
than those subjects in the condition requiring the 
defense to prove insanity. Furthermore, those subjects 
that were in the instruction condition requiring the 
prosecution to prove sanity most frequently said it was 
the defense that was required to prove insanity. This 
finding supports the idea that possibly once the jurors 
made up their mind that the defendant was guilty they 
were not attuned to information that may have been 
contrary to their hypotheses about the defendant. This 
is consistent with social cognition research that 
suggests that people have a tendency to gather 
information about others in ways that confirm their 
beliefs about that person. Pyszcznski and Greenberg 
(1987) suggest that even though accuracy is considered 
to be an important goal it is not the only goal that 
may be motivating an individual in arriving at an
attribution.
/
The instructions used were pattern jury 
instructions. These are the types of instructions that 
Severance & Loftus (1982) have found to be difficult to 
understand. The findings from this study confirm the 
previous findings about the difficulty subjects have in 
understanding the instructions, particularly
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instructions concerning burden of proof issues. The 
most frequently missed question concerned who had the 
burden of proof and the meaning of the level of proof 
(Severance & Loftus, 1982; Kerr et al., 1976). These 
findings are also consistent with Dane's (1985) 
conclusion that the concept of reasonable doubt is a 
difficult concept for juries to comprehend and to apply 
effectively in their decision making process.
Group deliberation did not significantly effect 
decisions regarding guilt and therefore this study does 
not offer confirming evidence for the group 
polarization effect suggested by McGuire, Keisler, and 
Siegel (1987). The lack of a significant finding may 
be due to the high number of guilty verdicts in the 
initial decision process. But the findings are 
supportive of the group polarization effect because 
there were more guilty verdicts after deliberation than 
before deliberation. The average of the individual's 
preferences after deliberation moved more to the pole 
that the majority of the individuals preferred prior to 
deliberation. This is also consistent with the social 
decision scheme model proposed by Davis (1973) which 
predicts that the verdict preferred by a clear majority 
of jurors at the outset of deliberation is likely to be
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chosen as the group's final verdict.
This may reflect the normative influence process 
that jurors use to resolve initial differences (Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955). Because of the large number of guilty
verdicts before deliberation the number of not guilty
f
verdicts in each jury was relatively small. Therefore, 
the not guilty verdicts were generally influenced to 
reach a consensus by changing their vote to guilty.
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Table 1
Distribution of Jury Verdicts bv Instruction
Guilty Not Guilty
Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt 3 3
Clear & Convincing 4 2
Defense
Clear & Convincing 6 0





















*After deliberation there were significantly more not 
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts when the burden 





F ratios for the IPO on the 2 (level of proof) x 2 
(burden of proof) repeated measure ANOVA.






































Mean Scores on the IDO Before and After Deliberation bv
Instruction
Prosecution
IDQ(1) IDQ(2) IDQ(3) IDQ(4)
Reasonable
Doubt
3.89/3.83 2.97/2.63 3.54/3.51 3.69/3.66
Clear and 
Convincing
4.36/4.29 2.90/2.87 4.16/4.07 4.10/4.00
Defense
IDQ(1) IDQ(2) IDQ(3) IDQ(4)
Reasonable
Doubt
4.33/4.36 3.18/3.03 3.82/3.76 3.85/3.79
Clear and 
Convincing






























Mean Number of Correct Answers out of seven on the 




Reasonable Doubt 3.68 3.71
Clear and Convincing 3.96 4.12
Defense
Reasonable Doubt 4.21 4 .12




Distribution of Correct and Incorrect Answers to 
Question 6 on the Comprehension Questionnaire
Incorrect Correct
Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt 28 7
Clear and Convincing 23 9
Defense
Reasonable Doubt 3 3 0




ANCOVA Results for the IDQ with Scores on the IDQ 




Level .17 1 . 17 .42 . 52
Burden .48 1 .47 1.16 .28
Lev x Burd .21 1 .21 . 52 .47
Level .77 1
IDQ ( 2 )
.77 1.49 .23
Burden 1.15 1 1.15 2.43 . 12




Burden .01 1 .01 . 02 .88




Burden .02 1 .02 .05 .82





Level .24 1 .24 .20 . 66
Burden .36 1 .36 .30 .59
Lev x Burd .01 1 . 01 
IDQ(61
.01 .95
Level .06 1 . 00 . 00 .07
Burden 1.63 1 1.63 3 . 34 .07
Lev x Burd .96 1 .96 1.98 .16
IDO ( TOTAL)
Level 1.43 1 1.43 . 16 .70
Burden 5.76 1 5.76 . 63 .43





Jeff Arnold is indicted for the federal crime of 
kidnapping and use of a firearm.
DEFENSE
Defendant raises the defense of insanity. There 
is not much dispute as to the facts surrounding the 
crime.
APPLICABLE LAW
The insanity defense is asserted by Mr. Arnold as 
his only defense. Basically, most of the facts 
regarding the crime are agreed upon by both sides. The 
federal law defines insanity as the following:
The test is a two-pronged test: (1) the
defendant must have a severe mental disease 
or defect. If there Is no such mental 
disease or defect you need not consider the 
second prong; (2) Because of the mental 
disease or defect, the defendant must not 
have been able to appreciate the nature and 





1. Jeff Arnold and Barbara Shore begin a 
romantic relationship in 1983 while both working 
at a TV station.
2. In 1984 relationship stops because Barbara 
changes jobs. Relationship resumes in 198 6.
3. Jeff Arnold is married to someone else for 
most of relationship. In August 1986 he says he 
will get a divorce and marry Barbara. Barbara is 
surprised by this. Relationship stops.
4. February 1987- relationship resumes.
5. May 1988- Barbara accepts job in Richmond, 
and Jeff accepts job in D.C. Jeff helps Barbara 
move into her new apartment and ends up staying 
there.
6. Barbara's parents find out Jeff is living 
with Barbara and that he is married to Susan.
They get upset, call Barbara and suggest she break 
up with Jeff.
7. November 1988- Jeff gets a divorce from Susan 
and asks Barbara to marry him. She first says 
yes, and then declines.
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8. November 1988- Barbara's father has heart 
attack and Barbara goes to parent's house to help 
mother. Barbara does not want to see Jeff, but he 
comes to her parent's house and causes a 
disturbance. The police are called.
9. Jeff tries to abduct Barbara in car so that 
they can work their problems out. Barbara agrees 
to resume relationship so he will take her back 
home. She later calls him and tells him this was 
not true.
10. December 1988- Jeff has gun and meets Barbara 
in parking lot. Jeff tampered with car so she 
could not escape. A co-worker rescued her.
11. Barbara gets restraining order.
12. New Year's Eve Jeff abducts Barbara from 
parent's home. Very carefully planned out the 
abduction: rigged truck, maps, food, handcuffs, 
gun, climbs into attic and cuts hole in ceiling, 
cuts telephone wires. Cuts one alarm but another 
is set off. He shakes when he breaks into house.
He carries a gun.
13. Jeff expresses concern that police might
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follow so takes back roads. Tells her they are 
going to Mexico. Has maps, Spanish translation 
books.
14. First night stays in N.C. hotel. Jeff makes 
sexual advances and Barbara complies. She says it 
is out of fear.
15. Jeff allows Barbara to make phone calls 
through which FBI locates them. Jeff spends most 
of time talking how he wants them to get back 
together and that if only he could get her alone 
away from her parents influence, everything will 
be o.k.
16. After being in jail for six months, and 
Barbara has not visited him, Jeff still believes 
that she has feelings for him.
17. Jeff threatens suicide on their trip south.
He says if she won't be with him he'd rather die. 
He had previously threatened suicide if Barbara 
did not join him in D.C.
18. Jeff goes through a serious depression after 




19. After Barbara returned the engagement ring 
Jeff had given her she gave him a Christmas 
present. It was a pillow and a note attached 
saying she loved him.
20. Jeff had no history of any kind of violent or 
anti-social behavior before 1983. There was no 
evidence of any psychopathology.
DEFENDANT'S CASE
- Defendant's expert Dr. Robert Close is a 
psychiatrist at Norfolk Sentara Hospital and a 
professor at EVMS medical school.
- He interviewed Jeff in September and October 
1989 and reviewed other psychiatric reports, 
including the staff at Federal Prison where Mr. 
Arnold is being held. He also reviews Dr. Day's 
report. Also reviews basis for opinion list.
1. personal interviews (2).
2. other psychiatric reports including 
psychiatric prison reports and that of Dr. 
Day.
3. written letters/statements of defendant 
including essay "About my love."
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4. FBI reports: interview with Jeff
Arnold, interview with Barbara Shore, 
inventory of truck's contents, interview with 
Patty Hark.
- Important that Jeff had no psychiatric problems 
prior to 1983.
- Another important event: call from Barbara's
parents voicing disapproval of the relationship. 
This creates a great deal of tension.
- First indication of unrealistic behavior is his 
jealousy. Suspicious and possessive.
- After Barbara returned engagement ring- Jeff's 
behavior was significant. He strongly felt that 
Barbara does love him and that her parents are 
interfering with their relationship. He believes 
that she still loves him, but that she is unable 
to express it because of interference of her 
family.
- Clear change in Jeff's behavior when he tried to 
abduct her from parking lot and road in December 
1988:
- very depressed (symptoms- low mood, crying,
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difficulty with sleep, decreased energy.) All he 
could think about was Barbara. Lost interest in 
all usual activities.
- Jeff still felt Barbara loved him even after she 
got a restraining order telling him to keep away 
and lawyer calls him telling him to move out of 
Barbara's apartment. The same day he gets voter 
registration certificate, so that he and Barbara 
would have I.D. if they crossed Mexico border.
- At this point, Jeff is clearly delusioned. He 
is also suffering from a major depression. This 
persisted throughout December. He could not work, 
he had insomnia or hypersomnia. He felt like life 
was not worth living if Barbara was not with him. 
He has delusions of persecution, jealousy and 
erotomania and also the delusion that Barbara 
loved him despite the evidence to the contrary.
- The delusion is that despite all the evidence to 
the contrary, Jeff still believes Barbara loves 
him. He is so committed to this idea that he 
would go to any length to try to get her with him. 
He believed the world was doing him wrong by
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trying to keep them apart. A delusion is a fixed 
false belief.
- Three parts to the delusion:
1. Barbara loved him despite contrary 
evidence.
2. That Barbara's parents were interfering 
with her expression of her love.
3. That her parents interference with their 
relationship was wrong and dishonest and he 
should do what he had to, to give their 
relationship a chance.
- Even though Jeff knew what he was doing was 
illegal, and he made great plans to avoid capture, 
he thought what he was doing was right.
- Summary of psychiatric diagnosis:
1. first evidence of disturbance is 
pathological jealousy and excessive 
possessiveness and suspicion.
2. after Barbara leaves him he develops a 
major depression.
3. also has the paranoid delusion that 
Barbara is in love with him and that other
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people are doing wrong by keeping them apart.
- At the time of offense he had a mental disease- 
including a paranoid disorder with erotomania and 
a major depressive reaction.
Erotomania: a paranoid disorder whereby the
person has a delusion or a fixed false belief 
that someone else is in love with him when 
there is evidence to the contrary. It is a 
delusional disorder not associated with 
hallucination or thought disturbance as seen 
in paranoid schizophrenia.
- Even after his arrest, Jeff was making plans to 
abduct Barbara. This plan was revealed to Patty 
Hark. this shows delusional quality of his 
thinking.
- He reconciles Jeff's trying to elude capture- by 
saying that Jeff perceived he was doing the right 
thing even though he knew it was illegal. (At 
time of report by Dr. Close, DSM III did not have 
an erotomania category. It has since been added.)
- Dr. Close agrees with Dr. Day that Jeff was 
aware that other people thought what he was doing
Insanity Defense
62
was illegal- but Dr. Close says Jeff himself 
subjectively did not appreciate that what he was 
doing was wrong. Dr. Close distinguishes between 
a legality and what is subjectively thought to be 
right or wrong.
PROSECUTION'S CASE
- Dr. Day: Government's expert witness:
- credentials: psychiatrist at Medical College of
Virginia and Professor of Psychiatry at Virginia 
Commonwealth University.
- does not believe that defendant suffers from 
erotomania for the following reasons:
- Barbara and Jeff had a genuine relationship. 
Barbara had communicated to Jeff that she loved 
him as late as November 1988.
- Jeff does not have a delusion that she loves
(
him. Evidence exists that she does love him.
- Does not think erotomania should be diagnosed 
after a relationship ends.
- It may be the defense mechanism of denial rather 
than a delusion.
- Jeff suffered from no other delusion. He did
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exhibit jealousy when they were living in Richmond 
and when they moved back to Norfolk. But this was 
not delusional.
- Only evidence that makes him wonder whether Jeff 
has erotomania is after his arrest when he has no 
contact with Barbara he still believes Barbara has 
no ill feelings towards him and that she may even 
visit him in prison. This is quite a distortion 
according to Dr. Day. But he says it does not 
amount to a delusion because as recent as the 
abduction, Barbara told him that she loved him 
(even if it was said for her survival). Dr. Day 
calls this an unrealistic hope and not a delusion. 
The unrealistic hope was not founded in 
psychopathology, but in his love for Barbara.
- Jeff did not have any psychosis
- During the time he was depressed, his 
functioning varied. At times he slept all day and 
did not work. This is characteristic of severely 
depressed people. At other times he functioned 
quite well. He was functioning well when he 
planned the first abduction. He became depressed
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again after his plan failed.
- Jeff knew the nature and quality of his actions. 
This is shown by his meticulous planning of the 
alleged crime (disabling phone line and alarm at 
Barbara's parent's house).
- This planning and these actions also show that 
he appreciated the wrongfulness of his acts. He 
cut the phone lines and this shows he was thinking 
ahead.
- Also Jeff told him that he experienced extreme 
shaking when he cut the hole in attic roof. This 
emotional arousal showed that he realized 
something bad may happen to him and that he 
recognized what he was doing. He therefore 
appreciated the nature and quality of his actions.
- He was also aware that his actions were wrongful 
which is evidenced by him disabling the phone 
lines, taking a gun with him showed that he may 
encounter resistance, taking back roads to avoid 
detection.
- He knew what he was doing was wrong and that 
Barbara did not want to go with her. If he had
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erotomania he would have thought Barbara wanted to 
go with him and he would not have had to use 
force.
- He tells his mother on the phone during the 
abduction that he is sorry he has hurt her, he 
asks if FBI knows he has truck and what the 
license plate is. All these show he appreciated 
the wrongfulness of the crime.
- Jeff did not suffer from a mental disease or 
defect at the time of the crime.
- Jeff did not have delusion that Barbara did not 
want to be with him because of her parent's 
objection. This was not a delusion because it did 
have some basis in fact.
- In Jeff's mind he thought if was proper for him 
to abduct Barbara. This is selfishness. It does 
not mean that he did not appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his actions.
WHAT IS EROTOMANIA?
- Erotomania is a delusional disorder. The main 
feature is the delusion which is a fixed false 




- These delusional disorders are uncommon and 
difficult to treat.
- The DSM-III-R makes the presence of delusions in 
the absence of schizophrenia, affective, or 
organic illness the essential features of this 
condition.
- Requirements:
1. nonbizarre delusions (i.e. involving 
situations that occur in real life- such as 
being followed)
2. auditory or visual hallucinations if 
present are not prominent
3. apart from the delusions, the behavior is 
not bizarre.
4. if major depressive or manic syndrome has 
been present during the delusional 
disturbance, the total duration of all 
episodes of the mood syndrome has been brief 
relative to the total duration of the 
delusional disturbance.
5. has never met criteria for schizophrenia,
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and if cannot be established that an organic 
factor initiated and maintained the 
disturbance.
- Specify type: Erotomania- delusional disorder
in which the predominant theme of the delusion is 
that a person, usually of a higher status is in 
love with the subject.
- Freud referred to a male in formulating the 
concept of erotomania but actually women more 
freguently have the disorder. The person fancies 
that a famous man is in love
with her and therefore she with him. She feels 
that for reasons known only to the two of them, 
the loved one cannot acknowledge this love openly. 
She may pursue him but then be shocked by his 
sexual advances, since sexual reality does not 




Jury Instruction: Burden of Proof on Defendant to prove 
Insanity Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to 
read the instructions to you. You will not receive a 
copy of the instructions.
1. You have now heard all the testimony in this 
case and the argument of counsel. It now becomes the 
Court's duty to give you the law that should govern 
your decision in this case. The law applicable to this 
case is given to you in all these instructions. It is 
your duty to follow the instructions. They will be 
given to you orally as I am doing. Faithful 
performance by you of your duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. It is your duty to 
determine the facts and to determine them from the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from 
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in 
guess work and speculation. The opening and closing 
statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but 
they are not evidence. You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or 
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each 
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial 
consideration.
2. When the defendant asserts the defense of 
insanity, then the burden to prove that insanity rests 
with the defendant. The defendant must assert that, he 
cannot require the Government to prove that he is not 
insane. That burden is on the defendant to prove that 
he is mentally incompetent as the instruction's define 
here.
3. The defendant has been charged in the 
indictment with willfully and knowinginly kidnapping 
and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1201. He has also been 
charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
4. Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do 
an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which 
is contrary to the law. An act is done willfully if it 
is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
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with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the 
law. I am going to read the next two instructions to 
you which have to do with the question of the issue of 
insanity or wrongfulness.
5. Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there 
is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged 
offense. The law does not hold a person criminally 
accountable for his conduct while insane, since an 
insane person is not capable of forming the intent 
essential to the commission of a crime. A defendant 
is insane within the meaning of these instructions if 
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting 
the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental 
disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature 
and quality of his acts or was unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his acts. For the purpose of throwing 
light upon the mental condition of the accused at the 
time of the alleged offense the jury may consider 
evidence of his mental state both before and after that 
time. The material issue, however, is whether the 
defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged 
criminal conduct. Unless evidence is offered to the
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contrary, a defendant is presumed sane. If, however, 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was insane as defined in these instructions, you may so 
find on your verdict form. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt based on reason and common sense- the kind of 
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.
6. Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means 
wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. In 
other words, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant because of a mental disease or defect lacks 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct, even if he knows his conduct to be 
criminal, but so commits it because of a delusion that 
was justified, then your verdict must be not guilty by 
reason of insanity.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you 





Jury Instruction; Burden of Proof on Defendant to prove 
Insanity bv Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to 
read the instructions to you. You will not receive a 
copy of the instructions.
1. You have now heard all the testimony in this 
case and the argument of counsel. It now becomes the 
Court's duty to give you the law that should govern 
your decision in this case. The law applicable to this 
case is given to you in all these instructions. It is 
your duty to follow the instructions. They will be 
given to you orally as I am doing. Faithful 
performance by you of your duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. It is your duty to 
determine the facts and to determine them from the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from 
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in 
guess work and speculation. The opening and closing 
statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but 
they are not evidence. You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or 
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each 
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial 
consideration.
2. When the defendant asserts the defense of 
insanity, then the burden to prove that insanity rests 
with the defendant. The defendant must assert that, he 
cannot require the Government to prove that he is not 
insane. That burden is on the defendant to prove that 
he is mentally incompetent as the instruction's define 
here.
3. The defendant has been charged in the 
indictment with willfully and knowinginly kidnapping 
and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1201. He has also been 
charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
4. Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do 
an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which 
is contrary to the law. An act is done willfully if it 
is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
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with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the 
law. I am going to read the next two instructions to 
you which have to do with the question of the issue of 
insanity or wrongfulness.
5. Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there 
is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged 
offense. The law does not hold a person criminally 
accountable for his conduct while insane, since an 
insane person is not capable of forming the intent 
essential to the commission of a crime. A defendant 
is insane within the meaning of these instructions if 
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting 
the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental 
disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature 
and quality of his acts or was unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his agts. For the purpose of throwing 
light upon the mental condition of the accused at the 
time of the alleged offense the jury may consider 
evidence of his mental state both before and after that 
time. The material issue, however, is whether the 
defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged 
criminal conduct. Unless evidence is offered to the
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contrary, a defendant is presumed sane. If, however, 
you find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant was insane as defined in these instructions, 
you may so find on your verdict form. When a party has 
the burden of proving an issue by clear and convincing 
evidence, he must produce evidence that creates in your 
mind a firm belief or conviction that he has proved the 
issue.
6. Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means 
wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. In 
other words, if you find by clear and convincing 
evidence that defendant because of a mental disease or 
defect lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct, even if he knows his 
conduct to be criminal, but so commits it because of a 
delusion that was justified, then your verdict must be 
not guilty by reason of insanity.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you 





Jury Instruction: Burden on Prosecution. Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to 
read the instructions to you. You will not receive a 
copy of the instructions.
1. You have now heard all the testimony in this 
case and the argument of counsel. It now becomes the 
Court's duty to give you the law that should govern 
your decision in this case. The law applicable to this 
case is given to you in all these instructions. It is 
your duty to follow the instructions. They will be 
given to you orally as I am doing. Faithful 
performance by you of your duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. It is your duty to 
determine the facts and to determine them from the
i
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from 
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in 
guess work and speculation. The opening and closing 
statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but 
they are not evidence. You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or 
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each
i
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial 
consideration.
2. The defendant has been charged in the 
indictment with willfully and knowinginly kidnapping 
and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1201. He has also been 
charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
3. Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do 
an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which 
is contrary to the law. An act is done willfully if it 
is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say 
with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the 
law. I am going to read the next two instructions to 
you which have to do with the question of the issue of 
insanity or wrongfulness.
4. Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there 
is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged 
offense. The law does not hold a person criminally
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accountable for his conduct while insane, since an 
insane person is not capable of forming the intent 
essential to the commission of a crime.
The government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt either that at the time of the offense charged, 
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect, 
or that despite the mental disease or defect he had 
substantial capacity both to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law. A reasonable doubt is 
a doubt based on reason and common sense- the kind of 
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.
For the purpose of throwing light upon the mental 
condition of the accused at the time of the alleged 
offense you may consider evidence of his mental state 
both before and after that time. The material issue, 
however, is whether the defendant was sane or insane at 
the time of the alleged criminal conduct.
5. Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means 
wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. In 
other words, the defendant may have been aware that his 
conduct was criminal, but in order for you to find him
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sane, you roust find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
w<as able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for 





Jury Instruction; Burden of Proof on Prosecution, 
Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to 
read the instructions to you. You will not receive a 
copy of the instructions.
1. You have now heard all the testimony in this 
case and the argument of counsel. It now becomes the 
Court's duty to give you the law that should govern 
your decision in this case. The law applicable to this 
case is given to you in all these instructions. It is 
your duty to follow the instructions. They will be 
given to you orally as I am doing. Faithful 
performance by you of your duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. It is your duty to 
determine the facts and to determine them from the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from 
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in 
guess work and speculation. The opening and closing 
statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but 
they are not evidence. You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or 
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each 
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial 
cons ideration.
2. The defendant has been charged in the 
indictment with willfully and knowinginly kidnapping 
and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 12 01. He has also been 
charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
3. Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do 
an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which 
is contrary to the law. An act is done willfully if it 
is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say 
with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the 
law. I am going to read the next two instructions to 
you which have to do with the question of the issue of 
insanity or wrongfulness.
4. Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there 
is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged 
offense. The law does not hold a person criminally
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accountable for his conduct while insane, since an 
insane person is not capable of forming the intent 
essential to the commission of a crime.
The government must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence either that at the time of the offense 
charged, the defendant did not have a mental disease or 
defect, or that despite the mental disease of defect he 
had substantial capacity both to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law. When a party has the 
burden of proving an issue by clear and convincing 
evidence, he must produce evidence that creates in your 
mind a firm belief or conviction that he has proved the 
issue.
For the purpose of throwing light upon the mental 
condition of the accused at the time of the alleged 
offense the jury may consider evidence of his mental 
state both before and after that time. The material 
issue, however, is whether the defendant was sane or 
insane at the time of the alleged criminal conduct.
5. Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means 
wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. In
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other words, the defendant may have been aware that his 
conduct was criminal, but in order for you to find him 
sane, you must find by clear and convincing evidence 
that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
actions.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for 






Sex ______  ID_ ____
Instructions: Please indicate on the line to the left
of each question a number indicating your attitude 
towards the defendant's insanity defense plea in the 
hypothetical case.
Scale: 1 2  3 4 5
(strongly agree) (strongly disagree)
  1. The defendant is morally responsible for his
behavior.
  2. The defendant should be sentenced to prison
for a long time.
  3. The defendant's behavior indicated a high
probability of insanity.
  4. It is very likely that the defendant's
behavior was the direct result of a belief 
system reflecting a severe mental illness.
  5. The defendant should not be held criminally
responsible for his behavior.
  6. The defendant should be in a psychiatric





In the United States District Court 
for the College of William and Marv
United States of America 
Plaintiff,




Based on full consideration of the evidence I find 
(check one)
________  The defendant is not guilty by reason of
insanity.







Instructions : Based on your understanding of the
insanity defense, please place the letter corresponding 
to the correct statement on the line to the left of 
each numbered question.
_____ 1. Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found 
guilty by reason of insanity?
a. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist in his
own defense at the time of trial.
b. The defendant has a long history of
mental illness and the predominant medical 
evidence indicates his illness will not 
improve.
c. The defendant was incapable of forming 
the intent required for commission of the 
crime.
d. Both b and c.
Insanity Defense
87
2. Which evidence below could be considered when 
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a. The prior planning engaged in by 
defendant in preparation for the criminal 
act.
b. The testimony of family members regarding 
the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly 
after commission of the crime.
c. Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding 
the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime.
d. All of the above.
3. Which of the following would be the material 
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity 
plea?
a. The defendant's sanity or insanity at the 
time of the alleged offense.
b. Whether the defendant was actually guilty 
of the offense charged.
c. Whether the prosecution and defense 
expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the 
defendant's state of mind.
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d. Both a and b.
Which of the following statements is most 
consistent with the legal definition of 
insanity?
a. The defendant was psychotic at the time 
of the crime.
b. The defendant was justifiably enraged by 
a situation and could not control his 
impulses at the time of the crime.
c. The defendant was mentally ill and 
because of his illness could not appreciate 
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality of his acts and was 
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most 
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a. Mr. A because although he knew it was 
wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was 
laboring under a delusion that the crossing 
guard was actually the devil.
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b. Mr. B because he has been severely 
mentally ill most of his life and because of 
his mental illness he thought he was 
squeezing a lemon but actually he was 
strangling his wife.
c. Mr. C because when he saw a driver 
deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost 
all control of his impulses and struck the 
driver with a baseball bat.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following is true about the 
insanity defense?
a. Sanity is an element of the crime and 
must be proven by the government.
b. Insanity at the time of the crime must be
proven by the defense.
(
c. The government must show sanity at the 
time of the trial and the defendant must show 
insanity at the time of the offense.
d. None of the above.
The concept of reasonable doubt as applied to 
the insanity defense is consistent with which
Insanity Defense
90
of the following statements?
a. A reasonable doubt is doubt based on an 
individual's common sense.
b. If a juror has a doubt based on reason 
that the defendant was sane at the time of 
the offense, the juror should vote to acquit 
the defendant.
c. If the evidence more likely than not 
indicates that the defendant was sane at the 
time of the offense, the government has met 
its burden to show the defendant was sane at 
the time of the crime.




Sex ______  ID_ ____
Comprehension Questionnaire 
Instructions: Based on your understanding of the
insanity defense please place the letter corresponding 
to the correct statement on the line to the left of 
each numbered question.
_____  1. Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found 
guilty by reason of insanity?
a. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist in his
own defense at the time of trial.
b. The defendant has a long history of
mental illness and the predominant medical 
evidence indicates his illness will not 
improve.
c. The defendant was incapable of forming 
the intent required for commission of the 
crime.
d. Both b and c.
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2. Which evidence below could be considered when 
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a. The prior planning engaged in by 
defendant in preparation for the criminal 
act.
b. The testimony of family members regarding 
the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly 
after commission of the crime.
c. Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding 
the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime.
d. All of the above.
3. Which of the following would be the material 
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity 
plea?
a. The defendant's sanity or insanity at the 
time of the alleged offense.
b. Whether the defendant was actually guilty 
of the offense charged.
c. Whether the prosecution and defense 
expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the 
defendant's state of mind.
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d. Both a and b.
Which of the following statements is most 
consistent with the legal definition of 
insanity?
a. The defendant was psychotic at the time 
of the crime.
b. The defendant was justifiably enraged by 
a situation and could not control his 
impulses at the time of the crime.
c. The defendant was mentally ill and 
because of his illness could not appreciate 
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality of his acts and was 
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most 
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a. Mr. A because although he knew it was 
wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was 
laboring under a delusion that the crossing 
guard was actually the devil.
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b. Mr. B because he has been severely 
mentally ill most of his life and because of 
his mental illness he thought he was 
squeezing a lemon but actually he was 
strangling his wife.
c. Mr. C because when he saw a driver 
deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost 
all control of his. impulses and struck the 
driver with a baseball bat.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following is true about the 
insanity defense?
a. Sanity is an element of the crime and 
must be proven by the government.
b. Insanity at the time of the crime must be 
proven by the defense.
c. The government must show sanity at the 
time of the trial and the defendant must show 
insanity at the time of the offense.
d. None of the above.
If the prosecution has proven sanity at the 
time of offense by clear and convincing
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evidence, this means which of the following?
a. The prosecution has countered all 
reasonable arguments by the defense.
b. The jurors have little doubt that the 
defendant was sane at the time of the crime.
c. The jurors on balance believe the 
prosecution's expert psychiatric testimony 
over the defendant's psychiatric testimony 
regarding the defendant's sanity at the time 
of the offense.
d. The prosecution has created a firm belief 
in the juror's minds that the defendant was 




Sex _____  ID______
Comprehension Questionnaire
Instructions: Based on your understanding of the
insanity defense please place the letter corresponding 
to the correct statement on the line to the left of 
each numbered question.
_____  1. Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found 
guilty by reason of insanity?
a. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist in his
own defense at the time of trial.
b. The defendant has a long history of
mental illness and the predominant medical 
evidence indicates his illness will not 
improve.
c. The defendant was incapable of forming 




d. Both b and c.
Which evidence below could be considered when 
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a. The prior planning engaged in by 
defendant in preparation for the criminal 
act.
b. The testimony of family members regarding 
the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly 
after commission of the crime.
c. Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding 
the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following would be the material 
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity 
plea?
a. The defendant's sanity or insanity at the 
time of the alleged offense.
b. Whether the defendant was actually guilty 
of the offense charged.
c. Whether the prosecution and defense 
expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
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defendant's state of mind,
d. Both a and b.
4. Which of the following statements is most 
consistent with the legal definition of 
insanity?
a. The defendant was psychotic at the time 
of the crime.
b. The defendant was justifiably enraged by 
a situation and could not control his 
impulses at the time of the crime.
c. The defendant was mentally ill and 
because of his illness could not appreciate 
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality of his acts and was 
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
acts.
5. Which of the following defendants will most 
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a. Mr. A because although he knew it was 
wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was 
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
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guard was actually the devil.
b. Mr. B because he has been severely 
mentally ill most of his life and because of 
his mental illness he thought he was 
squeezing a lemon but actually he was 
strangling his wife.
c. Mr. C because when he saw a driver 
deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost 
all control of his impulses and struck the 
driver with a baseball bat.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following is true about the 
insanity defense?
a. Sanity is an element of the crime and 
must be proven by the government.
b. Insanity at the time of the crime must be 
proven by the defense.
c. The government must show sanity at the 
time of the trial and the defendant must show 
insanity at the time of the offense.
d. None of the above.
If a defendant has proven insanity by clear
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and convincing evidence this means which of 
the following?
a. He has countered all reasonable arguments 
by the prosecution regarding the defendant's 
insanity plea.
b. The jurors have little doubt that the 
defendant was insane at the time of the 
crime.
c. The jurors on balance believe the 
defendant's expert psychiatric testimony over 
the government's psychiatric testimony 
regarding the defendant's sanity at the time 
of the crime.
d. The defendant has created a firm belief 
in the jurors' minds that he was insane at 




Sex ______  ID_ ___
Comprehension Questionnaire 
Instructions: Based on your understanding of the
insanity defense from the information you have heard, 
please place the letter corresponding to the correct 
statement on the line to the left of each numbered 
question.
_____ 1. Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found 
guilty by reason of insanity?
a. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist in his
own defense at the time of trial.
b. The defendant has a long history of
mental illness and the predominant medical 
evidence indicates his illness will not 
improve.
c. The defendant was incapable of forming 




d. Both b and c.
Which evidence below could be considered when 
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a. The prior planning engaged in by 
defendant in preparation for the criminal 
act.
b. The testimony of family members regarding 
the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly 
after commission of the crime.
c. Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding 
the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following would be the material 
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity 
plea?
a. The defendant's sanity or insanity at the 
time of the alleged offense.
b. Whether the defendant was actually guilty 
of the offense charged.
c. Whether the prosecution and defense 
expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
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defendant's state of mind,
d. Both a and b.
Which of the following statements is most 
consistent with the legal definition of 
insanity?
a. The defendant was psychotic at the time 
of the crime.
b. The defendant was justifiably enraged by 
a situation and could not control his 
impulses at the time of the crime.
c. The defendant was mentally ill and 
because of his illness could not appreciate 
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d. The defendant was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality of his acts and was 
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most 
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a. Mr. A because although he knew it was 
wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was 
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
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guard was actually the devil.
b. Mr. ,B because he has been severely 
mentally ill most of his life and because of 
his mental illness he thought he was 
squeezing a lemon but actually he was 
strangling his wife.
c. Mr. C because when he saw a driver 
deliberately run over his dog Fide, he lost 
all control of his impulses and struck the 
driver with a baseball bat.
d. All of the above.
Which of the following is true about the 
insanity defense?
a. Sanity is an element of the crime and 
must be proven by the government.
b. Insanity at the time of the crime must be 
proven by the defense.
c. The government must show sanity at the 
time of the trial and the defendant must show 
insanity at the time of the offense.
d. None of the above.




a. The defense is an affirmative defense„
b. The defendant is presumed sane unless the 
defendant brings forth evidence to the 
contrary.
c. A reasonable doubt is based on reason and 
common sense.




Sex: Male______ Female______ (indicate how many in
your jury)
Group Jury Number: ______
In the United States District Court 
for the College of William and Mary 
United States of America
Plaintiff,




Based on full consideration of the evidence we, 
the jury find unanimously that (check one):
__________  The defendant is not guilty by reason
of insanity.
__________  The defendant is guilty of the
offense(s) as charged.







Sex: Male____ Female ___
Group Jury Number:________
1. Please indicate how you voted as a member of the 
jury.
______  The defendant is not guilty by reason of
insanity.
______  The defendant is guilty of the offense(s)
as charged.
2. Was this the same conclusion you reached when you 
filled out






Mean score on IDO(l^* as a function of level of proof 











































- # — Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
■ Clear and Convincing
Before Deliberation After Deliberation





Mean score on IPO(6)* as a function of level of proof 






















The defendant should be in a psychiatric hospital 




Addington v. Texas. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Ake v. Oklahoma. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
American Psychiatric Association (1983). American 
Psychiatric Association statement on the insanity 
defense. American Journal of Psychiatry. 140. 681- 
688.
Billeci v. U.S.. 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Bonnie, R.J. (1983). The moral basis of the insanity
defense. American Bar Association Journal. 69, 194-
197.
Borgida, E., & Park, R. (1988). The entrapment 
defense. Law and Human Behavior. 12., 19-40.
Callahan, L., Mayer, C., & Steadman, H. J. (1987).
Insanity defense reform in the United States: Post-
Hinckley. Mental and Physical Disability Law 
Reporter. 11. 54-59.
Carter v. U.S.. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Cruse, D., & Browne, B. A. (1987). Reasoning in a
jury trial: The influence of instructions. Journal
of General Psychology. 114 ( 2 ). 129-133.
Dane, F. C. (1985). In search of reasonable doubt: A
Insanity Defense
112
systematic examination of selected quantification 
approaches. Law and Human Behavior. 9 ( 2 )  . 141-158. 
Davis v. U.S.. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
Davis, J. H. (1973). Group decision and social
interaction: A theory of social decision schemes.
Psychological Review. 80, 97-125.
Davis, J. H. (1982). Social interaction as a
combinatorial process in group decisions. In H. 
Brandstatter, J. H. Davis, & G. Stocker-Kreichgauer 
(Eds.), Group decision making (pp. 27-58). London: 
Academic Press.
Davis, J. H., Kameda, T., Parks, C., Stasser, M., & 
Zimmerman, S. (1989). Some social mechanisms of 
group decision making: The distribution of opinion,
polling sequence, and implications for consensus. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 
1000-1012.
Davis, J. H., Kerr, N. L., Stasser, G., Meek, D., & 
Holt, R. (1977). Victim consequences, sentencing 
severity, and decision processes in mock juries. 




Davis, J. H., Stasser, G. , Spitzer, C. E., & Holt, R.W. 
(1976). Changes in group member's decision 
preferences during discussion: An illustration
within mock juries. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology. 34. 1177-1187.
Devitt, E. J., & Blackmar, C. B. (1987). Federal jury 
practice and instructions (3rd ed.). St. Paul:
West.
Dripps, D. A. (1987). The constitutional status of the 
reasonable doubt rule. California Law Review, 75, 
1665-1718.
Durham v . U.S.. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Elwork, A., Sales, B. D., & Alfini, J. J. (1977). In 
ignorance of the law or in light of it? Law and 
Human Behavior. 1 ,  163-189.
Greene, E. (1988). Judge's instructions on eyewitness 
testimony: Evaluation and revision. Journal of
Applied Psychology. 18(31. 252-276.
Handspike v. State. 203 Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662 
(1947) .
Helgeson, V. S., & Shaver, K. G. (1990). Presumption 
of innocence: Congruence bias induced and overcome.
Insanity Defense
114
Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 20(41. 276- 
302.
Homant, R. J., & Kennedy, D. B. (1987). Subjective 
factors in the judgement of insanity. Criminal 
Justice and Behavior. 14, 38-61.
Kagehiro, D. K. (1990). Defining the standard of proof 
in jury instructions. Psychological Science. 1(31. 
19-40.
Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966). The American jury.
Boston: Little Brown.
Kaplan, M. F. (1977). Discussion polarization effects 
in a modified jury decision paradigm. Sociometrv.
40. 262-271.
Kaplan, M. F., & Miller, C. (1977). Judgments and
group discussion: Effect on presentation and memory
factors on polarization. Sociometrv. 40. 337-343. 
Kaplan, M.F., & Miller, L. E. (1978). Reducing
the effect of juror bias. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology. 36. 1443-1455.
Kaplan, M. F., & Miller, C. E. (1983). Group
discussion and judgments. In P. Paulus (Ed.), Basic 
group processes (pp.65-94). New York: Springer.
Insanity Defense
115
Kerr, N. L. (1981). Social transition schemes:
Charting the groups road to agreement. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. 41. 684-702.
Kerr, N. L., Atkin, R. S., Stasser, G., Meek, D., Holt, 
R. W., & Davis, J. H. (1976). Guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt: Effects of a concept definition
and assigned decision rule on the judgement of mock 
jurors. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 34. 282-294.
Leland v. Oregon. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
M'Naghten's Case. 10 Clark & F. 2 00, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 
(H.L. 1843).
MacCoun, R. (1989). Experimental research on jury 
decision-making. Science. 244. 1046-1050.
McGuire, T. W., Kiesler, S., & Siegel, J. (1987).
Group and computer-mediated discussion effects in 
risk decision making. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology. 52(5). 917-930.
Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (1987). Toward an 
integration of cognitive and motivational 
perspectives on social inference: A biased
hypothesis-testing model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Insanity Defense
116
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, 
pp. 297-340). New York: Academic Press.
Rodman, J., & Greene, E. (1989). The use of paraphrase 
analysis in the simplification of jury instructions. 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality. 4(3). 
272-251.
Rogers, R. (1987). APA's position on the insanity 
defense: Empiricism versus emotionalism. American
Psychologist. 42. 840-848.
Severance, L. J., Greene, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1984). 
Toward criminal jury instructions that jurors can 
understand. The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology. 75, 198-233.
Severance, L. J., & Loftus, E. F. (1982). Improving 
the ability of jurors to comprehend and apply 
criminal jury instructions. Law and Society Review. 
17. 153-197.
Simon, R. J. & Aaronson, D. E. (1988). The insanity 
defense. New York: Greenwood.
Smith v. U.S.. 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
Stasser, G., & Davis, J. H. (1981). Group
decision making and social influence: A social
Insanity Defense
117
interaction sequence model. Psychological Review.
88. 523-551.
Strawn, D. U., & Buchanan, R. W. (1976). Jury
confusion: A threat to justice. Judicature. 59.,
478-487.
Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1986). Jury deliberations: 
Discussion content and influence processes in jury 
decision making. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 16, 322-347.
U.S. v. Amos. 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986).
U.S. v . Brawner. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
U.S. v. Freeman. 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986). 
Vollrath, D. A., Sheppard, B. H., Hinsz, V. B., &
Davis, J. H. (1989). Memory performance by 
decision-making groups and individuals. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes. 43. 289-300.
Weiner, B. A. (1980). Not guilty by reason of
insanity: A sane approach. Chicago Kent Law Review. 
56. 1057-1085.





Born in Washington D.C., November 5, 1954.
Graduated from University of Texas in Austin, Texas in 
1975, B.A., with a concentration in Anthropology, J.D. 
1980, Marshall- Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary, M.A. candidate, College of William of Mary, 
with a concentration in psychology. The course 
requirements for this degree have been completed, but 
not the thesis: Changes Implemented Pursuant to the
Insanity Defense Reform Act: Effect on Trial by Jury
Outcome.
